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Catholicism and liberalism* a 1994 collection of essays edited by 
R. Bruce Douglass and David Hollenbach includes essays explor-
ing three topics: missed opportunities for conversation between 
Catholicism and Liberalism 2 before Vatican II, Catholic contribu-
tions to Liberalism, and Liberal contributions to Catholicism. Fol-
lowing a discussion of these topics, I conclude by suggesting points 
for future conversations. 
Missed Opportunities for Conversation before Vatican II 
One version of the confrontation between Catholicism and Liber-
alism tells the story of how Liberalism defended the rights and 
liberties of individuals in the face of a tyrannical and oppressive 
church; another version describes how the Church attempted to 
hold back the erosion of values and society in the face of individu-
alism and materialism. A richer version of the confrontation is of-
fered by Stenfel's "The failed encounter: The Catholic church and 
liberalism in the nineteenth century." Prior to 1864, he notes, there 
was a missed opportunity for an exchange between Liberalism and 
Catholicism mediated by Catholic Liberalism. Although there were 
as many types of Catholic Liberals as styles of Liberalism, most 
Catholic Liberals appealed to individual religious freedom to de-
fend Catholicism, opposed a full rejection of the French Revolu-
tion, accepted the idea that truth could be revealed through sci-
ence, believed that scientific reason and theological reason should 
be used in appropriate areas, and attempted to minimize the influ-
ence of Liberalism on the structure of the Church itself. Because, 
however, Catholic Liberalism rejected the use of state power to 
impose Catholicism as the state religion, and because it was seen 
as encroaching on the papal monopoly on spiritual authority, the 
Auslegung, Vol. 23, No. 1 
116 AUSLEGUNG 
Church condemned Catholic Liberals for the heresy of indifferent-
ism, labeled them as traitors, fools, pagans, diseased, and contended 
that they were the pawns of the devil. The central difficulty ap-
pears to have been the identification of Catholic Liberalism with 
the anticlerical and anti-religious ideology of Liberalism. Had the 
Church instead recognized that Catholic Liberalism was not a com-
plete endorsement of Liberalism, Catholic Liberalism might have 
served as a mediator. 
The encounter between Liberalism and Catholicism was ini-
tially much less virulent in the United States, as Gleason recounts 
in "American Catholics and liberalism, 1789-1960." Gleason be-
gins by noting that Americans drew a distinction between Ecu-
menical and Sectarian Liberalism: the former endorsed individual 
rights, liberties, and freedoms, the restriction of state power, and 
representative government while the latter added to these anti-cleri-
calism and an opposition to religion. When Ecumenical Liberal-
ism was dominant in America there was fertile ground for the de-
velopment and support of Catholic Liberalism, particularly in light 
of the American separation of spiritual and political realms, each 
of which was to be governed by the appropriate authority, and in 
light of the important fact that despite the separation, America was 
a religious nation. After 1844, however, changes in America and 
Europe ensured that no conversation mediated by Catholic Liber-
alism would occur. In America, fears of Catholic growth, the rise 
of evangelical groups opposed to Catholicism, and concern that 
the hierarchy of the Church made Catholicism incompatible with 
democracy worked to transform Liberalism from Ecumenical to 
Sectarian. In Europe, the papacy opposed the use of state power to 
resolve social problems (e.g. the New Deal), attacked modernism, 
renewed calls for Catholicism to become the state religion, and 
allied itself with antidemocratic fascist governments. Thus, another 
opportunity for an exchange between Liberalism and Catholicism 
was lost. 
The value of these essays is that they enrich the history of the 
interaction between Liberalism and Catholicism. In keeping with 
this, a discussion of this history from the perspective of Liberal 
historians would be useful, for it would most probably included 
discussions of the Inquisition, Witch-Hunts, and Holocaust; events 
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that have contributed to the conversation between Catholics and 
Liberals. Second, although the focus of these essays is historical, a 
welcome inclusion would be a discussion of the Church's response 
to Liberation Theology, for here, too, it seems that the Church has 
failed to note the differences between Liberation Theology and 
Communism, and has thus lost an important opportunity for a con-
versation with Communism mediated by Liberation Theology. 
Catholic Contributions to Liberalism 
As Komonchak argues in "Vatican II and the encounter between 
Catholicism and liberalism" Vatican II was not simply, despite be-
liefs to the contrary, a wholesale endorsement of Liberalism. While 
the Church did accept the separation of church and state, renounced 
calls for the use of state force to impose Catholicism as the state 
religion, and accepted the right to religious freedom, it did so, not 
by embracing atomistic individualism, but by acknowledging the 
role this separation and this right (among others) played in the life 
of the community. As Hollenbach explains in "A communitarian 
reconstruction of human rights: contributions from Catholic tradi-
tion" the Church rejected the Liberal conception of the individual 
as a self established prior to and independently of relationships, 
whose freedom consists in setting both its own goals and deter-
mining its own individual conception of the good, whose rights are 
a protection from the encroachment of the state and other indi-
viduals, and who demonstrates autonomy by casting aside exter-
nal restraints. Instead, the Church embraced a vision of the self as 
social, as interconnected; as a self whose rights are not protec-
tions, but the minimum conditions for participating in the life of 
the community. Thus, the Church endorses the right to free speech 
and religious freedom, not because these rights protect the free-
dom of the individual to say and believe what she chooses, but 
because "[p]eople should be free to express their political and reli-
gious beliefs in public in order that the true nature of the common 
good of the community might be more adequately understood and 
pursued." 3 Hollenbach even suggests that the right not to be tor-
tured is communal in nature, for torture violates the right to be 
treated as a member of the community. Thus, while the Church 
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might support some of the same rights and freedoms as Liberal-
ism, it does so for different reasons, and thus Vatican II is not sim-
ply an endorsement of Liberalism. What Vatican II and the major-
ity of the essays in Catholicism and liberalism do begin is a con-
structive critique of Liberalism. 
Elshtain, drawing inspiration from Tocqueville and Aristotle, 
argues in "Catholic social thought, the city, and liberal America" 
that individualism has led to the pursuit of individual rather than 
shared ends with a consequent decrease in support for the organi-
zations that make up civil society. This is evidenced by increased 
murders and out-of-wedlock pregnancies. The decline of civil so-
ciety has allowed the state to step in, with the result that we are 
well on the way to Tocqueville's predicted tyranny of the state. 
This would be bad in itself, but Elshtain contends that the state is 
not well placed to resolve the social problems traditionally dealt 
with by civil society; for example, those facing the family. There-
fore, drawing inspiration from Aristotle, Elshtain calls for a re-
newed civil society, starting with a change in the political and legal 
structures to give more power and autonomy to cities, which not 
only help resist the tyranny of the state, but are well placed to nur-
ture civil society. Such cities will incorporate a shared view of the 
common good, promote rights and responsibilities, and produce 
"chastened patriots'Mndividuals who are skeptical about national-
ism, but support local civic activity. 
Gellott develops Elshtain's critique by examining the impact 
of Liberalism on a key aspect of civil society: the family. In "The 
family, liberalism, and Catholic social teaching" Gellott argues that 
Liberalism has relegated the family to the private sphere and is 
thus forced into silence on the problems it faces. Additionally, the 
individualism of Liberalism has reduced family relationships to 
contractual relationships. Third, Liberalism has promoted materi-
alism, which has further eroded the family by requiring all of the 
efforts of the family to be focused on the acquisition of goods, 
rather than the promotion of the family itself. Finally, Liberalism 
has allowed each individual to define the family as s/he chooses, 
further eroding the function and role of the family. Thus, Liberal-
ism has both left the family to fend for itself, and has introduced 
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forces hostile to the family. Drawing upon a Catholic vocabulary, 
Gellott attempts to repair the damage done by Liberalism. 
First, Catholic social thought offers the concept of mediating 
institutions (Elshtain's civil society). Thus, the family need not be 
regulated to the private (or public spheres). Second, Catholic dis-
cussion of solidarity offers an alternative to the contractual vision 
of the family (and society), for it views rights as both freedoms 
and obligations. In addition, solidarity offers a critique of materi-
alism and suggests that the focus of the family need not be the 
acquisition of goods. Finally, Catholicism offers a child-focused 
definition of the family. Recognizing the narrowness of this defi-
nition, Gellott attempts to soften its impact by suggesting that a 
richer definition of friendship be developed. 
Gellott's adoption of the vocabulary of Catholic social thought 
is not un-critical: she notes that Catholic social thought places the 
onus on women to be the nurturers, holds a negative attitude to-
ward women who work outside of the home, and denies women 
equality by denying them ordination. Before we examine these 
concerns, I want to examine another criticism of Liberalism. 
Drawing on a historical discussion of the common good, Dupre 
in "The common good and the open society" contrasts the view of 
the common good in the Catholic tradition (Augustine and Aquinas) 
with that of the modern, Liberal tradition (Hobbes and Locke). 
While the Catholic tradition contains a disagreement as to the na-
ture of the common good, immanent or transcendent, the Liberal 
tradition faces a more intractable problem. Incorporating a neu-
trality toward individual conceptions of the good, and thus endors-
ing no conception of the common good, it lacks an objective stand-
point from which to adjudicate disputes among individuals. Dupre 
therefore proposes a return to the Catholic common good tradi-
tion, which offers an objective common good, and "...a religious-
moral view of the human place in the cosmos and society."4 He 
adds, "[w]hat I am defending, in plain terms, is a return to virtue 
on a religious basis as an indispensable condition for any possibil-
ity of a genuine conception of, and respect, for the common good." 5 
It is interesting to note that of the authors in the volume only Dupre 
speaks specifically of a religious understanding of the common 
good. 
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A related problem is discussed by Tracy in "Catholic classics 
in American liberal culture": without a shared common good there 
is no shared vocabulary, save that of the restrictive instrumental 
reason, with which to hold public debates. This leads Tracy to ask 
how Catholic social thinkers can present their ideas without em-
ploying a Catholic or shared vocabulary. The solution is ingenious. 
Tracy reminds us that while "...every classic work of art or religion 
is highly particular in both origin and expression [it is]...deeply 
public in effect."6 Thus a Catholic could present her/his position 
not by means of an argument rooted in Catholicism or instrumen-
tal reason, but by selecting classic works of art and literature, of-
fering them to the public as the basis for a civic discourse, and 
thereby bringing about a public conversation in which the truth 
may be revealed. Tracy reminds us that he is drawing here upon 
the second of two American traditions: the Puritan Covenantal 
Conversation tradition. 
Liberal Contributions to Catholicism 
As I noted earlier, Gellott raises important Liberal criticisms of 
Catholicism: the onus on women to be the nurturers, negative atti-
tudes toward women who work, and the denial of equality demon-
strated by restricting ordination to men. Drawing from Liberal Femi-
nism, Segers raises similar concerns in "Feminism, liberalism, and 
Catholicism." She notes first that the Church holds the view that 
women are by nature best suited to be mothers and nurturers, and 
thus should make these their primary tasks. Second, that by deny-
ing ordination to women the Church reveals that it does not con-
sider women to be equal to men. And, third, that the Church re-
veals its prejudice against women by selecting from the varied sym-
bolism employed in the sacred writings only those that disempower 
women. For example, using only male terminology to refer to God 
and thereby ignoring the instances of female and neutral references 
to God. 
Despite these important criticisms, Segers believes that there 
are important commonalities that will foster a conversation between 
Catholicism and some varieties of Feminism. Although the rea-
soning employed differs significantly, Catholics and some Femi-
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nists seek to ban pornography, seek to ban contract pregnancy, and 
seek to offer alternatives to abortion. 
Future Conversation 
In this final section I want to raise three topics for further conver-
sation between Liberalism and Catholicism: the relationship be-
tween the individual and the common good, the content of the com-
mon good, and the resources available to Liberalism to address the 
important challenges raised in Catholicism and liberalism. 
As a starting point, consider the following: "It suffices that we 
agree on the principle that the good of the community takes prece-
dence over the maximum fulfillment of the individual, and that we 
be prepared to accept this as a maxim for moral action." 7 It is not 
immediately evident what Dupre means here by "maximum ful-
fillment of the individual", but what is evident is that the indi-
vidual good will, in at least some circumstances, but subordinate 
to the common good. This passage gives rise to two concerns for 
Liberals: first, it seems to leave the individual without protection— 
at any time the good of the individual may be sacrificed for the 
common good; second, since Dupre's understanding of the com-
mon good is a religious one, and more particularly, a Catholic one, 
not only is the individual good subordinate to a Catholic common 
good, but given the key role envisioned for the common good, a 
Catholic understanding of the common good would seem to lead 
to the development of a Catholic society. 
Elshtain attempts to address the first concern through the doc-
trine of subsidiarity: "...it is an injustice and at the same time a 
grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and 
higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can 
do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help 
(subsidium) to the members of the body social, and never destroy 
and absorb them." 8 Following Komonchak, she understands the 
doctrine of subsidiarity to offer protection to the individual good, 
for to make the individual good simply subservient to the common 
good would be to deny individuals the right to exercise self-re-
sponsibility, and society is not to supplant this right but to augment 
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it. 9 It remains to be determined whether this reading of subsidiarity 
offers sufficient protection to the individual good. 
That it might not is suggested by Ex Corde Ecclesiae.' ( ) Here 
the Church clearly affirms that the common good outweighs both 
freedom of academic inquiry and possibly even freedom of speech. 
Consider just two passages: 
"The Church, accepting the legi t imate 
autonomy of human culture and especially of the 
sciences', recognizes the academic freedom of 
scholars in each discipline in accordance with its 
own principles and proper methods, and within the 
confines of the truth and the common good."" 
[emphasis added] [It should be noted here that 
"truth" and "common good" are determined by the 
Church.] 
and, 
"It is intrinsic to the principles and methods 
of their research and teaching in their academic 
discipline that theologians respect the authority of 
the bishops, and assent to Catholic doctrine 
according to the degree of authority with which it 
is taught;"i2 [emphasis added] 
There are many other similar passages, but these two serve, I think, 
to indicate the limited degree to which the Church is willing to 
protect the good of the individual: even freedom of speech and 
research are subservient to the dictates of the (Catholic) common 
good. Further evidence is offered by Provost's "Rights of persons 
in the church" where, using the right to baptism as an example, he 
describes the difficulties that arose when disputes occurred: not 
only was there no clear process of adjudication, but the process 
that existed allowed parties to the dispute to participate in its settle-
ment. Thus, individuals have to worry that their individual good is 
not protected from the intrusion of the common good and that they 
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may have limited means, depending upon jurisdiction, to redress 
unwarranted intrusions. 
The central difficulty with using subsidiarity to protect the in-
dividual good, then, is that the individual's right to exercise self-
responsibility stems from the common good; having no indepen-
dent support, the right exists at the whim of the common good 
(similarly the right to baptism has no independent support; exist-
ing only at the whim of the Church). The difficulty I have in mind 
is similar to one often raised against utilitarianism: within utilitari-
anism individuals have rights, but these rights are simply privi-
leges it is to the advantage of the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number for individuals to hold. Thus, freedom of speech, for ex-
ample, may be revoked or restricted should the possession of this 
freedom by individuals no longer promote the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number. 1 3 Similarly, should circumstances change, 
should "right order" require it, the right to exercise self-responsi-
bility may be revoked. 
These selections from Ex Corde Ecclesiae also suggest some 
important questions about the relationship of civil society to pri-
vate and public society. If the institutions involved are private, then 
it might not seem out of place that the Church, by imposing restric-
tions on the membership and activities of the faculty, attempt to 
preserve the Catholic character of the institutions. If, on the other 
hand, the institutions involved are viewed as public, then the re-
strictions imposed by the Church seem to be out of keeping with 
the protections afforded by the Constitution and Bill of Rights. 
What, however, if the institutions are viewed as part of civil soci-
ety, as part ofthat society that exists "between" private and public? 
Should the rules of the Church State take precedence? Since the 
institutions have both a religious heritage and receive state support 
(in the form of financial aid to students, at least), the rules of both 
the Church and State can claim jurisdiction. What is required, then, 
is a conversation about jurisdiction, and the role of the State and 
Church in civil society. 
Dupre's passages also raises the problem of determining the 
content of the common good, and the related concern that if the 
content is Catholic, one is in principle endorsing a Catholic soci-
ety. Dupre suggests that the "...citizens build the common good up 
124 AUSLEGUNG 
from the ground...constantly revising and reconceiving it in accor-
dance with the particular needs of the time....The common good 
ought to reflect the ever-active choices of free individuals, which 
it grounds, guides, and restricts."' 4 Most would agree, I think, that 
the common good ought to be a reflection of the view of the indi-
viduals who constitute the society; however, Dupre offers no clear 
procedure for the construction of interpersonal utility scales, and 
no resolution to the problems that attend such a construction. For 
example, Arrow's contention that there is no way to translate indi-
vidual preferences into a social preference without violating the 
condition of nondictatorship.'5 Lastly, Dupre needs to reconcile 
this passage with the one cited earlier in which he calls for a reli-
gious content for the common good: there is no guarantee that the 
common good constructed from the preferences of individuals in 
the society will be a common good with religious content. Possi-
bly these problems can be solved, but more worrisome is Dupre's 
call for a religious understanding of the common good. 
When Dupre calls for a religious understanding of the com-
mon good and "...a religious-moral view of the human place in the 
cosmos and society"' 6 what is entailed? A view of the universe as 
the place of a cosmic struggle between good and evil? A concep-
tion of sin and salvation? One could add to this list of questions 
indefinitely, but the worry expressed is that Catholicism, thwarted 
in its overt attempt to make itself the state religion, instead seeks to 
achieve the same result by means of endorsing a common good, 
and then ensuring that the common good endorsed is Catholic in 
character. This worry is somewhat far fetched, but raising it leads 
to several important issues. First, how is the content of the com-
mon good to be determined? Is it to be specified, and if so by whom? 
Is it to be constructed, and if so by what process? Second, since 
there are different understandings of the content of the common 
good, what will the relationship of these contents be to one an-
other? One might not agree with Dupre that the content of the com-
mon good must be religious, but the implicit question is important: 
what should be the content of the common good? 
The essays in Catholicism and liberalism have raised some 
important difficulties for Liberalism, and in so doing have contrib-
uted to an important conversation. I next want to examine some 
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possible beginnings of a Liberal contribution to this conversation. 
Specifically, I want to examine Catholic assumptions about the 
Liberal conception of the person, the options Liberals have for re-
solving disputes among individuals, Liberal contributions to pub-
lic reason, and Liberal responses to the problems facing the fam-
ily. In order to fix ideas, I will use John Rawls's Political Liberal-
ism^1 as the basis for the Liberal contributions to this conversation. 
One of the key assumptions of the essays is that Liberalism's 
conception of the person is one of individuals defined prior to so-
cial unions, and of individuals who are engaged in a process of 
self-invention that necessitates violating any and all established 
social rules. The second, part of what Elshtain labels "ultra-liber-
alism", is true, perhaps of Nietzsche's or Foucault's conception of 
the individual, but it is not immediately evident that it holds true 
for all or even most Liberalisms. Moreover, it is not immediately 
evident that Liberalism must embrace both of these features. That 
Liberals, too, might hold a conception of the person that is socially 
determined, even if defined prior to social unions, is exemplified 
by Rawls' political conception of the person as possessing two 
moral powers: the capacity for a conception of the good and the 
capacity for a sense of justice, each of which requires for develop-
ment and exercise the basic liberties, several of which, including 
freedom of association, are social. 
In his essay, Dupre suggests that lacking a conception of the 
common good and being neutral with respect to the good of indi-
viduals, Liberalism has no objective standpoint from which to ad-
judicate disputes among individual conceptions of the good. What 
is not evident is that Liberalism needs an objective standpoint, and 
that lacking one, it has no means for adjudicating disputes. Again, 
consider the Liberalism of John Rawls. Rawls argues that indi-
viduals behind the veil of ignorance will construct the two prin-
ciples of justice, which will then be used to guide the constitu-
tional convention, and later legislative and judicial decisions. While 
the two principles of justice are not "objective" in the sense meant 
by Dupre, they do serve to adjudicate disputes among individuals, 
and since they are constructed by representative individuals using 
ideas latent in Anglo-American democratic society, they possess, 
Rawls contends, the needed authority. 
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Tracy raises and ingeniously resolves another problem for Lib-
eralism: since Liberalism lacks a conception of the common good, 
it lacks a common vocabulary, save for that of instrumental rea-
son, and thus offers no vocabulary for Catholic social thinkers to 
articulate their views. First, it might be interesting to explore how 
far one could take instrumental reason; consider for example 
Gauthier's Morals By Agreement™ where using only the vocabu-
lary of decision theory he argues for such basic moral principles as 
the need to keep promises. Second, it is not immediately evident 
that if there is a conception of the common good that Catholic so-
cial thinkers will be in a better position—it is always possible that 
the conception of the common good is antithetical to Catholicism 
and thus offers it no vocabulary with which to articulate its posi-
tions. Finally, Tracy has offered an ingenious solution, the employ-
ment of classic works to initiate conversation, but Rawls, too, has 
a solution worth considering. Rawls suggests that when involved 
in public discussions of justice individuals are allowed to employ 
the vocabulary of their individual, private, conceptions of the good, 
so long as at a later time, they demonstrate how their positions 
may be defended by using public reason, e.g. by using the com-
mon vocabulary of public documents such as the Constitution, Bill 
of Rights, Supreme Court Opinions, et cetera. While there is a sig-
nificant limitation here, the need to at some point demonstrate that 
the private view can be supported by public reason, there is at least 
an option available for Catholic social thinkers. 
Lastly, Gellott raises important concerns stemming from 
Liberalism's treatment of the family as private, which has the re-
sult that the family can not be given the support it requires. Placing 
the family within civic society can, she contends, offer it the re-
quired support. It is worth noting that Liberalism has an additional 
option: treat the family as a public institution and thereby offers its 
members the protection afforded by public law.' 9 This suggestion 
again opens a conversation about the relationship of public society 
to civil society, and the ability of each to protect and nurture insti-
tutions. 
I have not sought here to develop and argue for Liberalism; 
my purpose was only to suggest some possible points to encourage 
future conversations. If we are, as Rawls contends, in an age where 
the traditional liberal compromise establishing public and private 
realms and assigning religion to the private realm is unraveling, 
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then such conversations as those suggested by Catholicism and 
liberalism will be critical if we are avoid a contemporary version 
of the 17th Century Wars of Religion. 
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